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The inflow of large quantities of foreign aid into Rwanda 
since 1994 can have potential adverse effects such as 
aid dependency via a significant negative effect on tax 
efforts and on public investments. This paper carries 
out a theoretical and empirical study to examine these 
issues. The theoretical part develops a model in which 
the recipient government decides on the optimal level 
of tax and optimally allocates total government revenue 
between current expenditure and public investment.  
The theoretical model makes it possible to empirically 
test whether an increase in aid is likely to reduce the 
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optimal tax rate and the proportion of public expenditure 
allocated to public investment. The econometric analysis 
uses time series data on Rwanda to show, in line with 
other studies in the literature, a negative relationship 
between increased aid and the tax rate; but the magnitude 
of the effects are extremely small. In the case of Rwanda, 
reforms to the tax administration and expansion of the 
tax base have had mitigating effects. As far as the effect 
on public investment, the overall effect was negative in 
the past; however, since 1995 the direction of this effect 
has changed.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the impact of aid flows on fiscal policy in Rwanda.  A tremendous 
amount of aid has been transferred to the country to assist in rebuilding the infrastructure 
and institutions that were destroyed in 1994.  As the country moved from a period of 
reconstruction and stabilization toward sustained growth, total overseas development 
assistance (ODA) as a share of GDP averaged 29.7 percent and dropped from 95 percent 
in 1994 to 19.2 percent in 2004.  Between 2005 and 2006, total ODA averaged just over 
14 percent of GDP.  However, over the past decade, foreign direct investment as a share 
of GDP averaged only 0.23 percent of GDP, while average savings as a share of GDP 
was -1.4 percent, highlighting the importance of ODA in sustaining the growth 
experienced over the past decade.   
With the new G-8 initiative on debt forgiveness and an increased focus of donors 
on the poorest countries, particularly those in Africa, there are good indications that the 
level of support to Rwanda is likely to be scaled up.   Over the period, 2007 to 2020, aid 
flows could double to as much as 30 percent of GDP, provided the government continues 
to maintain sound policies.  This would give rise to a substantial inflow of aid to the 
economy, while domestic revenue would likely remain below 20 percent of GDP. 
To ensure that these high levels of aid lead to sustained growth and macro 
stability, it is useful to evaluate the impact of aid on key policy variables, particularly 
related to fiscal policy.  In this study we will assess the fiscal impact of aid in Rwanda 
through an econometric analysis of historical trends over the past, and the impact of these 
trends on key variables of fiscal policy in Rwanda, over the period 1980 - 2004.   
  2The theoretical and empirical literature to be discussed below shows that aid can 
undermine revenue mobilization.  This implies that if aid discourages tax effort, it can 
perpetuate or even increase aid dependency. Thus, we will examine whether this is the 
case in Rwanda.  Has aid discouraged tax effort?  Secondly, we shall examine if aid has a 
negative effect on the proportion of public expenditure allocated to public investment. 
Following the seminal work of Heller (1975), there is now a substantial theoretical and 
empirical literature on the fiscal consequences of foreign aid (see, for example, Mosley et 
al., 1987; Binh and McGillivray, 1993; Feyzioglu et al., 1998; Franco-Rodriguez et. al.; 
1998, Swaroop et al., 2000).
1 This literature examines the effect on foreign aid on tax 
revenue and public investment.
2 On the theoretical side, most models work with variants 
of the framework developed by Heller (1975) in which the government’s objective 
function is quadratic in a number of macro variables such as the difference between the 
level of public investment and its target value, the difference between tax revenue and its 
target value, and so on. This choice of the objective function is somewhat ad hoc. On the 
empirical side, the literature covers time-series country studies, cross-country studies, and 
also panel data analysis. Although there are some exceptions, on the whole, the literature 
indicates that aid has a negative effect on tax revenue, but not so on public investment. 
This paper contributes to this expanding literature in two ways. First of all, we 
develop a different theoretical framework based on microeconomic and welfare-theoretic 
principles with distortionary and revenue-raising effects of taxes. The government in our 
framework uses the tax rate and the allocation of total expenditure between current 
                                                 
1 See McGillvary and Mossissey (2004) for a review of the literature. 
2 There is also the broader literature on aid fungibility; fiscal channels being one of many ways in which 
full effects of aid may not be realized. See, for example, Khilji and Zampelli (1994), Pack and Packi 
(1994),  Feyzioglu et al. (1998), and Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2004) for the issue of aid fungibility. 
  3expenditure and public investments as instruments for maximizing inter-temporal utility. 
We also distinguish between private and public investments. On the empirical side, we 
focus on a country in Africa, namely Rwanda, which has drawn very little attention in the 
literature, but has received large amounts of foreign aid particularly since 1994. Rwanda 
has also gone through a significant change in terms of policy regime since 1994. Thus, it 
would be interesting to examine if the fiscal effect of aid has changed qualitatively due to 
a new policy environment. Finally, whereas the bulk of the literature examines the effect 
of aid on the levels of tax revenue and public investment, in this paper we focus on – in 
both the theoretical and the empirical part -- the effect on the rate of taxation and the 
proportion of total government expenditure that is allocated to public investment. 
The paper proceeds first by outlining a theoretical model that will enable an 
examination of the fiscal effects of increased aid.  Regression analysis is used to examine 
the effect of increased aid on key fiscal variables.   
 
2. The Importance of Aid in Rwanda 
The importance of aid in Rwanda stems from it being the main source of capital flows 
and financing for investments (given the extremely low levels of foreign direct 
investment), as well as its impact on macroeconomic stability.  In the balance of 
payments, capital flows are primarily capital grants and net borrowing (on concessional 
terms), and aid is the major source of finance for the budget.  In addition, aid funds have 
led to increased liquidity in the economy which has required close monitoring and 
management to maintain macroeconomic stability.  Surges in foreign aid, following the 
  41994 crisis, resulted in increases in M2 (narrow money) and large changes in nominal 
GDP and inflation.  
Figure 1:  Public Investment is Defined by Availability of Donor Grants 
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Source:  World Development Indicators and IMF, as cited in World Bank (2007). 
 
These changes were due to several factors. First, the government introduced new 
notes and coins, which had the effect of devaluing the national currency by 45 percent. 
Second, there was a huge increase in the amount of currency in circulation in a situation 
where people were forced to keep their money in very liquid form.  These factors 
contributed to an average rate of growth of narrow money of 11.4 percent over the period 
2000-04 (and contrasts with a growth rate of 14.8 percent during 1990-99, and 3.9 
percent over the period 1980-89).   
Given the high level of liquidity arising from the large inflow of aid, the 
government’s approach to sterilizing the excess liquidity also has had an impact on fiscal 
  5policy.  To control inflation and the growth in the money supply, the government has 
resorted to the sales of treasury bills.  This has resulted in an increase in domestic debt 
from a level of less than 5 percent of GDP, over the past two years, to 6 percent in 2006.  
World Bank (2007) reports that there was some indication of potential crowding out of 
the private sector, as credit to the economy and net credit to government displayed moved 
together in a counter-cyclical fashion, between 1998 and 2003.  Up until 2003, this 
counter-cyclical trend between the two series (credit to the economy and government), 
was more pronounced because t-bills were used mainly to finance the budget.  Between 
2002 and 2004, shortfalls in budget support, coupled with increased spending (i.e. on 
elections), contributed to increased sales of t-bills, as a means of financing the budget.  
Since 2005, sales of foreign exchange have become an increasingly important instrument 
for sterilization of excess liquidity.  However, given government’s concern on the 
potential effects of exchange rate appreciation on exports, emphasis has been placed on 
the use of t-bill sales as a tool for monetary management.  In the past year or so, however, 
increased liquidity in the commercial banks, arising from buoyant activity in the NGO 
sector (as demonstrated through increased disbursements to project accounts), has 
provided an additional source of liquidity and therefore eliminated the countercyclical 
trend between credit to the economy and government.  As a result, the two series have 
moved in a pro-cyclical fashion since 2005 (see Quarshie 2007).  
The evidence, on the face of it, indicates that increased aid flows have not 
adversely affected the level of revenue and that expenditure has been mainly on priority 
poverty reduction areas.  Revenue as a share of GDP has increased steadily since 1998 
from around 10 percent to just over 14 percent of GDP in 2006.  In case of priority 
  6expenditure, Table 1 shows that there has been an increase in allocation to priority areas 
since 1998 (both during the period of decline in aid, between 2002 and 2003, and from 
2004-2005 when aid flow increased again). 
Table 1: Rwanda:  Priority Spending, 1998-2005 
(In percentage of GDP) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Budget 18.9 19.7 18.7 21.0 21.3 21.9 25.2 26.2
Total priority expenditure of which: 2.8 3.9 5.3 5.3 6.4 6.9 7.0 8.4
   Education 2.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9
   Health 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
   Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
   Export promotion 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5
   Transport and communication 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.9
   Infrastructure(Energy and water) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
   Common Development Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3
   Other* 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.3
 
Source: Rwandese authorities and World Bank (2007). 
* This category includes spending on internal affairs, local government, commerce, and youth and sports. 
 
In addition, since 1998, the government has adopted reforms to improve the 
efficiency of tax administration and revenue.  The Rwanda Revenue Authority, charged 
with tax collection, was established in 1997.  Four years later, the value-added-tax was 
implemented and a year later, in 2002, the tax code was revised.  The result was that 
government revenue, estimated at about 13 percent of GDP in 1992, and which had fallen 
to below 4 percent in 1994, began to increase gradually to reach an average of around 10 
percent per annum between 1996 and 2001.  By 2002, revenues stood at 12.2 percent of 
GDP, reflecting the increase in the VAT rate from 15 to 18 percent, and the substantial 
strengthening of revenue administration.  Revenue as a share of GDP rose further in the 
following years and is now just under 15 percent.  Thus, the increased share of tax 
  7revenue out of GDP reflect past reforms, and further reforms that took place from 2003, 
including the taxation of in-kind benefits.   
The discussion above, along with the data in Table 1 and the trend in revenue 
(compared to that of foreign aid), shown in Figure 2 below, suggest that increased aid has 
not adversely affected tax revenue and spending for poverty reduction.  It may however, 
have increased the level of domestic borrowing.  Aid has been spent on the priority areas 
identified in the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy.  To examine the marginal 
impact of aid on these variables, the next section elaborates a theoretical model which is 
then estimated econometrically in section 4. 
 
Figure 2:  Trend in Foreign Aid (including Grants and Loans), Domestic Revenue 
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Source: World Development Indicators and authors’ calculation. 
Note:  Grants to government include unrequited, non-repayable, noncompulsory government receipts from other governments or international 
institutions. Foreign loans represent debt outstanding and disbursed. Net ODA disbursements equal gross ODA disbursements less principal repayments 





  93. A Theoretical Model 
We consider an open economy lasting two periods, 1 and 2. Since we do not 
consider any issue related to trade, for simplicity, we assume that it produces one final 
(consumption) good per period. The second-period price is taken as the numeraire, and 
we denote by p the relative price of the good in the first period. 
There are two types of capital: private and public. The economy starts at t=1 with 
K  units of private capital. At t=1, the private sector adds to this through investment, I, 
which becomes available at t=2.  
The government derives its revenue in period 1 from three sources: from foreign 
aid T, from consumption tax at the rate τ, and from lump-sum tax L. A fraction λ of 
government revenue is used to accumulate public capital. The remaining (1-λ) fraction of 
government revenue is used to produce a public good (g) which gives utility to the 
people. This expenditure can be thought of as a recurring or social expenditure. The 
economy starts at time t=1 with F  amounts of public capital. At t=1, the government 
adds to this through public investment, F, which becomes available at t=2. Public 
investment can be thought as development expenditure such as infrastructural 
development. 
On the demand side of the economy, utility level u, as previously noted, is 
positively affected by the provision of public good. The inter-temporal expenditure 
function E(p(1+τ), 1/(1+r), g, u) denotes the minimum expenditure (in present value) 
required to achieve a given level of utility u at constant consumer prices and public good 
provision level. r is the rate of interest. The partial derivative of the expenditure function 
  10with respect to u, Eu, denotes the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income.
3  Since 
public good increases household utility, the partial derivative of the expenditure function 
with respect to g, Eg, is negative and -E5 denotes the households’ marginal willingness to 
pay for the public good (e.g., see Chao and Yu, 1999). That is, a higher level of public 
good consumption requires a lower level of spending on private goods to mitigate its 
positive effects so that a constant level of utility is maintained. The expenditure function 
is assumed to be strictly convex in g, i.e.  . That is, a higher level of public goods 
provision reduces the households’ marginal willingness to pay for the public good. It is 
also assumed that  ,  i.e. a higher level of utility increases the households’ 
marginal willingness to pay for the public good. Formally,  
0 > gg E
0 < gu E
Assumption 1               0 < gu E, 0 > gg E.
The production side of the economy in periods 1 and 2 are given by the 
‘restricted’ revenue function   and a normal revenue function  ) , (
1 g p R
) , , 1 (
2 F F I K R + +  respectively, as functions of the producers’ price of the aggregate 
good and factor endowments.
4  
The period-2 revenue function is a standard one. However, the restricted revenue 
function in period 1 which gives the value of private outputs, needs further explanations. 
Let   denote the vector of total factor endowments in period 1, where   and  ) (
g p v v v + =
p v
                                                 
3 The partial derivative of the expenditure function with respect to a price gives the compensated demand 
function for that good. Also   where  . For more properties of the 
expenditure function see Dixit and Norman (1980). 
pp E ) )) 1 ( ( / (
2 2 τ + ∂ ∂ = p E E pp
4The endowments of all factors other than private and public capital are omitted as they do not vary in our 
analysis. The partial derivative of a revenue function with respect to a price gives the supply function of the 
good, and that with respect to an endowment of a factor gives the price of that factor.   for i=K,F. 
For properties of the revenue function see Dixit and Norman (1980). 
0 ≤ ii R
  11g v  are respectively the vectors of factors used in the production of the private goods and 
the public good. The country’s maximum value of production of private goods is denoted 
by a restricted gross domestic product, or restricted revenue function,  ) , (
1 p v p R , defined 
as:  
  )}, ( : { max ) , (
1 p
x
p v T x px v p R ∈ =  
where   is the private sectors aggregate technology set, and x is net output of the 
private good. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale in public good production 
and that the public sector competes with the private sector in factor markets, the cost-
minimization problem in the public sector yields a unit cost function of producing the 






  ). , (
1 p
v v p R w p =  
It is well known from the properties of the unit cost function that the demand for 
factors of production in the public sector,  , is equal to   (e.g., see Abe, 1992; 
Hatzipanayotou et al., 2002). Therefore,  
g v g w C
g
w ) (
  . )) , ( ( ) (








p − = − =  
Solving the above equation for  , we get  , and since v does not 
vary in our analysis, we define the restricted revenue function as  
p v ) , , ( v g p v v
p p =
  )). , , ( , ( ) , (
1 1 v g p v p R g p R
p
v
p =  
  12It is well known (e.g. Abe, 1992) that  , the unit cost of 
producing the public good. For the rest of the analysis, for simplicity, we assume that 
.
) ( )] / ( [
1 w C g R R
g
g = ∂ ∂ − = −
0 = gg R
5   
Having done the ground work, the economy can now be described by the 
following equations:  
), , , 1 (
1
1
) 1 ( ) , ( ) , ,
1
1
), 1 ( (
2 1 F F I K R
r
G L g p R I u g
r
p E + + ⋅
+
+ − + − = +
+
+ λ τ          (1) 
 , L T pE G p + + =τ                                         (2) 
   G F λ =                                                           (3) 
                                                                                                              (4)  , ) 1 (
1g R G g − = −λ
                                                                                                                        (5)  , 1
2 r RK + =














− + − ⋅ − + + = λ τ
                            (6) 
where   denote the partial derivative of E with respect to the second argument and it 
represents the private consumption in the second period. 
1 E
Equation (1) describes the inter-temporal budget constraint for the representative 
consumer. Total discounted present value of consumptions expenditure (left hand side) is 
equal to the sum of total factor income from private production in period 1 (first term on 
the right hand side), factor income form the public sector in period 1 (third term), and 
                                                 
5 This assumption implies that changes in g which change factor supplies available to produce private 
goods, do not affect its unit cost of production. It is to be noted that most of our results will go through 
when   is not zero (the more general assumption is that  gg R 0 ≤ gg R  (see Abe 1995 for the properties of 
the restricted revenue function when  is negative).   gg R
  13discounted value of factor income in period 2 (fourth term), minus lump-sum taxes paid 
(second term). Equation (2) says that government revenue in period 1 is equal to the sum 
of consumption tax revenue, foreign aid and lump-sum taxes. Public investment in period 
1 is a fraction λ of government revenue (equation (3)). Equation (4) states that the total 
amount allocated for the production of public good in period 1 (left hand side) is equal to 
the total cost of producing the public good (right hand side). Private investment I is 
determined optimally by the representative consumer by setting ∂u/∂I=0, yielding 
equation (5). Finally, equation (6) defines the amount of borrowing that the representative 
consumer makes in period 1: it is defined either to be its excess consumption expenditure 
over income in period 1, pr equivalently to be its discounted value of excess income over 
expenditure in period 2. 
This completes the description of the model. The six equations (1)-(6) determine 
six endogenous variables in u, g, G, I, F, and B. The policy instruments are τ, L and λ, 
and the exogenous variables include T, r and the price p. 
3.1. Optimal Policies 
Having developed the model in the preceding section, we shall now characterize the 
optimal policies. Since a government’s ability to raise lump-sum taxes is usually limited 
(see, for example, Wilson, 1991), we shall take lump-sum tax L to be exogenous and 
determine optimal values of consumption tax rate τ and allocation parameter (between 
public good production (social expenditure) and public investment) λ. 
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to state a few assumptions. First we 
assume that the public good and the taxed private good are taken to be independent in 
  14consumption, and all the adjustments of a change in the public good provision (at a given 
utility level) fall on the numeraire good (see Wilson (1991, p.159) for a discussion on the 
separability between public and private goods). Second, we assume that income effect 
does not fall on the taxed consumption good (see, for example, Keen, 1987; Lahiri and 
Raimondos-Møller, 1998). Finally, we assume that private and public capital are 
complements. Formally,  
Assumption 2            0 = = pu pg E E ,       0
2 > KF R.
Differentiating (1)-(5), we get:  






d pE dg E du E
F
p g u +
+ − − = τ                                                (7) 
                                , ) ( dT d pE E p dG pp p + + = τ τ                                                           (8) 
                                      , dG Gd dF λ λ + =                                                                       (9) 
                                                                                         (10)  , ) 1 (
1 dG Gd dg Rg λ λ − + − = −







KF ⋅ =                                                                             (11) 
  Equation (7) says that welfare is positively related to the level of public good g 
and of public capital F, but decreases with consumption tax τ because of a decrease in 
consumers’ surplus. Note the welfare does not depend directly on the level of private 
investment  I as it is optimally chosen by the private sector (envelope theorem). An 
increase in foreign aid T increases total government expenditure G (equation (8)). An 
increase in τ has two opposite effects on G: it raises tax revenue for every unit of initial 
consumption level, but it also reduces the level of consumption and thus the level of tax 
revenue for a given level of the tax rate. An increase in λ increases public investment by 
  15diverting funds from social expenditure (first term in (9)). An increase in G increases 
public investment for a given level of λ (second term in (9)) An increase in G also 
increases the level of public good provision g (social expenditure) for a given level of λ 
(second term in (10)). An increase in λ decreases g by allocating less of public 
expenditure to social expenditure. Finally, equation (11) shows that an increase in public 
investment increases the level of private investment if the two types of investments are 
complementary, i.e., if  .   0
2 > KF R
We now examine how the policy parameters λ and τ, and the level of foreign aid 
T affects welfare. For this, substituting (8)-(11) in (7), we derive:  

























































































                       (12)   
An increase in λ has two opposite effects on welfare: it decreases the provision of 
public good and increases public investment. An increase in foreign aid T, for a given 
level of λ, increases both the provision of public good and the level of public investment, 
and thus it has unambiguous positive effect on welfare. An increase in τ has two effects. 
First, it reduces consumers’ surplus and thus welfare. This is the marginal cost of 
consumption tax. The second effect is via its effect on tax revenue. It increases tax 
revenue, i.e., if  0 ) ( > + pp p pE E p τ , and then it has the same positive effect as foreign aid 
via increases in both the provision of public good and the level of public investment. This 
is the marginal benefit of consumption tax. 
  16From (12), setting ∂u/∂λ=∂u/∂τ=0 and simplifying, we get the following two first 
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where ε2  ) / ) 1 ( ( ))) 1 ( ( / ( / ) 1 ( ( p p p pp E p p E E p E τ τ τ + ⋅ + ∂ ∂ − = + − = ), is the compensated 
price elasticity of demand for good 2. 
The left hand side of (13) gives the marginal cost (decrease in social spending) of 
increasing λ and the right hand side the benefits (increase in public investment). Since in 
a poor country, the rate of return to public capital is high and the marginal willingness to 
pay for a public good is low, one would expect the optimal value of λ to be rather small 
in order for optimality condition (13) to hold. From (14) it also follows that here there 
will be under provision of the public good as compared to the Samuelsonian rule 
( ) if and only if  . 
1
g g R E = r R R K F + = > 1
2 2
The optimality condition for τ is similar to the well-known inverse-elasticity rule 
of optimal commodity taxation under a revenue constraint (see, for example, Diamond 
and Mirrlees, 1971). Since there are two possible use of government revenue here and the 
allocation between the two is also optimal, the exact formula for optimal commodity 
taxation is somewhat different from the ones found in the literature. Since an increase in 
consumption tax increases, inter alia, public capital, the rate of return to public capital is 
positively related to the level of optimal consumption tax. This observation will be shown 
to have some important implications for the effect of foreign aid on public investment. 
  173.2. Fiscal Impacts of Foreign Aid 
Having characterized the optimal values of τ and λ in the preceding section, in this 
section we shall examine the effect of an exogenous change in the level of foreign aid on 
the optimal values of τ  and λ, private investment I, public good provision g, public 
investment F, and the level of borrowing B. These will tell us how foreign aid affects tax 
efforts, recurring expenditure, development expenditure, private investment, and 
borrowing. 
Differentiating (13) and (14) and using (8)-(14), we get:
6   
 , 13 12 11 dT d d α τ α λ α = +                                                            (15) 
 , 23 22 21 dT d d α τ α λ α = +                                                            (16) 
where  
, 0 ) ( , 0
) 1 (
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Solving (15) and (16) simultaneously, we derive:     
, 0
) (

























d η λ λ λ η
τ
ε α λ
                        (17) 
                                                 
6Note that   as revenue functions must be negative semi-definite in factor 
endowments. The fact that 
0 2 > Δ
0 11 < α  and  0 22 < α  go toward confirming that the second-
order conditions for the government’s optimization problem are satisfied. See also see the 
sentence below (18). 













= Δ                                                  (18) 
where 0 ) / )( / ( > ∂ ∂ − = u u u E g g E η  and  0 ) / )( / ( > ∂ ∂ − = g g g E g g E η , and 
 in order for the second order condition for the government’s 
optimization problem to be satisfied. 
0 21 12 > − a a
u
22 11 = Δ a a
η  is the home country’s marginal propensity to pay 
for the public good,  g η  is the elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay for the public 
good with respect to the public good provision. 
From assumptions 1 and 2, it follows that dλ/dT <0. That is, an increase in 
foreign aid will raise the proportion of government revenue going to the production of 
public good and reduce the proportion going to public investment. Formally, 
Proposition 1 An increase in foreign aid would reduce the proportion of government 
revenue that is allocated for public investment.  
The above result can be explained intuitively as follows. Since  0 < gu E  
(assumption 2), an increase in foreign aid increases the marginal cost of increasing λ 
(given by the left hand side of (1)). Foreign aid, by increasing public investment for given 
value of λ, also reduces the marginal benefit since  . 0
2 < FF R
7  Therefore, an increase in T 
unambiguously decreases the optimal level of λ.  
Turning now to the effect on tax efforts, from (18) we find that an  0 / < dT dτ  if 
and only if  u g η λη > . That is, if this condition is satisfied, an increase in foreign aid 
decreases tax efforts. In the special case of preferences where 
                                                 
7There are second round effects which are dominated by these initial direct effects. For example, an foreign 
aid-induced increase in F increases domestic investment which increases marginal cost of β since 
 (assumption 2).  0
2 > KF R
  19)) ( ), 1 /( 1 ), 1 ( ( ) , ), 1 /( 1 ), 1 ( ( g f u r p E u g r p E − + + = + + τ τ  with  , ' ' 0 ' f f > >
8  it can be 
verified that  ) ' / ' ' ( f gf u g − =η η  and thus when the optimal level of β is large (which is 
expected to be the case, as argued before) the condition is indeed satisfied.  
Our result on tax effort is stated formally in the following proposition. 
Condition 1                u g η λη >
Proposition 2 Under condition 1, an increase in foreign aid reduces the optimal level of 
consumption tax rate.  
The above proposition can be explained as follows. The direct effect of an 
increase in T is to reduce the optimal value ofτ . An increase in T, for a given level of λ, 
increases government budget and therefore public investment F. This reduces the rate of 
return to public investment   and therefore the right hand side of (14) (the marginal 
benefit of λ). However, there is an indirect effect which works via changes in λ. As we 
have seen above, an increase in T reduces the optimal level of λ — the proportion of 
government budget allocated to public investment, and this increases   and thus 
increases the optimal level of τ. It can be verified that the magnitude of this indirect 






η  and decreases with  g η . An increase in T increases g and 
therefore  , reducing marginal cost of λ (left hand side of (13)). The magnitude of this 
reduction depends on the magnitude of 
g E
g η . An increase in T also increases u reducing 
 and therefore increasing the marginal cost of λ. The magnitude of this increase  g E
                                                 
8This will be the case if the utility function is additively separable in private and public consumption. 
  20depends on the magnitude of  u η . It so happens that the direct effect of an increase in T 
dominates the indirect effect if and only condition 1 is satisfied. 
Differentiating (4) we find  
  . ) 1 (












+  (19)  = − −
Substituting (17) and (18) in (19), we obtain  






















 (20)  λ
τ
That is, an increase in T unambiguously increases the provision of public good. 
Even though the effect of T on τ and therefore tax revenue is ambiguous, the effect of a 
foreign aid-induced increase in 1-λ dominates. 














= Δ  (21) 
Thus, under condition 1, an increase in T increases F and therefore from (11) private 
investment I. Formally,  
Proposition 3 An increase in foreign aid increases the provision of public good, and 
under condition 1, also increases both public and private investments.  
As noted before, the optimal level of τ is positively related to the rental rate of 
public capital   which in turn is negatively related to the level of public capital. Thus, 
under condition 1, the level of public investment increases via a decrease in the 
consumption tax rate. Finally, since public and private capital are assumed to be 
complementary, foreign aid also decreases private investment via a decrease in public 
2
F R
  21investment. An increase in foreign aid reduces tax efforts under condition 1, i.e., crowd 
out tax revenue but not to the full amount and therefore both social expenditure and 
public investment increase. Note that since F=λG, an increase in T must increase total 
government expenditure G as it increases F and decreases λ. 
As for the effect on borrowing, differentiating (6), we get:  
   (22)  , ) 1 ( 1 1 1 2
2 2 du E dg E d E p dF R dI R dB r u g p F K − − − + = + τ
where from (12)-(14) we have:  









=                                                             (23) 
Since both private and public investments go up as a result of foreign aid, period-2 
income go up on these counts. These effects are given by the first two terms on the right 
hand side of (22). Since foreign aid decreases consumption tax in period 1 and thus the 
consumer price in that period, it shifts some private consumption from period 2 to period 
1, reducing expenditure in period 2. This effect is given by the third term on the right 
hand side of (22). The penultimate term on the right hand side of (22) will also increase 
borrowing comes via an increase in social expenditure. An increase in g must reduce 
private consumption in order to keep utility constant. Since we assume that the effect of 
an increase in g falls entirely on the numeraire good (assumption 2),  . All these 
effects will tend to increase net income over expenditure in period 2 and therefore the 
demand for borrowing in period 1. The last term gives the positive income effect on 
period-2 expenditure, since foreign aid unambiguously increases inter-temporal real 
income given by u (equation (23)). This is the only term which will reduce the demand 
0 1 < g E
  22for borrowing. It may be reasonable to assume that this effect will be dominated by the 
other positive effect on borrowing. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section we develop and test an empirical framework suitable to analyze two of the 
hypothesis derived from our theoretical model. The key predictions of the theoretical 
model are that an increase in aid reduces the tax efforts of the government (proposition 2) 
and the proportion of public expenditure that is spent on public investment (proposition 
1). Using a time series data set for Rwanda, we will test these two hypotheses in the 
context of an econometric model derived as a reduced form of the theoretical model.  
We consider linear regressions of the form: 
1 5
3 2 1 0





β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + +
DUMMY GDP ODA DUMMY
LAB GDP EXP GDP ODA PUBINV = TOTEXP
                (24) 
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ε β β
β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + + =
DUMMY GDP ODA DUMMY
LAB GDP EXP GDP ODA GDP TAXREV
       (25)  
where 
PUBINV/TOTEXP = Public investment as a percentage of total public expenditure, 
TAXREV/GDP= Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, 
ODA/GDP = Overseas development assistance as a percentage of GDP, 
EXP/GDP= Exports as a percentage of GDP, 
LAB= Labor force (number of people who meet the ILO definition of the economically 
active population), 
  23DUMMY(96+) = Takes the value 1 for 1996 onward, and zero otherwise. 
  PUBINV/TOTEXP represents the variable λ, TAXREV/GDP is a proxy for the 
tax rate τ,  and ODA/GDP is foreign aid T, in our theoretical analysis. We have added 
other explanatory variables such as EXP/GDP and LAB as control variables. As 
mentioned before, the economy of Rwanda went through very significant changes after 
the genocide of 1994; in particular many of the changes in terms of the policy regime 
came into effect in 1996. Thus, the qualitative effect of aid on the endogenous variables 
can be different after1996 compared to what it was before then. To capture this effect we 
have included an intercept dummy (DUMMY(96+)) as well as a slope dummy that 
interact with ODA/GDP. Based on proposition 1 and 2, we expect a negative signs for 
both β1 and β7.  
Before discussing the results, it is useful to discuss the data. 
Description of Data 
The data used in this study come from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2006). 
Table 2 summarizes the mean, median and standard deviation of the variables used in the 
regression.  As can be seen from the above table, all the variables display fair degree of 
variations. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  





TAXREV  ODA/GDP LAB  EXP/GDP 
 Mean   40.81   9.85   20.29   2.99   8.32 
 Median   39.42   10.08   17.24   2.82   7.65 
 Maximum   60.29   12.67  95.05   4.18   14.44 
 Minimum   19.23   3.62  9.54   2.28   5.15 
 Std. Dev.   10.31   1.92   18.3   0.59   2.71 
 Skewness   0.21   -1.32   3.12  0.75   0.66 
 Kurtosis   2.55   5.81   12.65   2.29   2.29 
 
  24 
Before we commence on model estimation, we need to determine the stationarity 
nature of the variables of interest. In view of that, we begin our analysis by performing 
unit root test for each variable using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) unit root tests. While we are doing the ADF test we pick the lag length on the 
augmentation term based on whether the exclusion of lagged term causes serial 
correlation in the test equation’s error term.  As for the PP test, on the other hand, we use 
a truncation lag of one given the fact that the frequency of our data is annual. 
 
















TAXREV  -1.79 -4.64
** -1.79 -4.64
** -3.74 








EXP/GDP  -1.79 -4.64
** -1.79 -4.64
** -3.74 
Note: ADF is the augmented Dickey Fuller test and PP is Phillips-Perron test. The null hypothesis is that the series is 
non-stationary. The asterisks (**) represent a rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level. PubInv represents public 
investment as a share of total government expenditure, TaxRev is the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, PubInv_T is 
PUBINV/(100-PUBINV/TOTEXP_T is (PUBINV/TOTEXP)/(100-PUBINV/TOTEXP), TAXREV_T is 
TAXREV/(100-TAXREV), ODA is the ratio of official development assistance to GDP, Labor is total labor force and 
Export is the ratio of total exports in GDP.  
Table 3 presents the estimated ADF statistics. All variables appear to have at least 
one unit root, since the nonstationarity test is not rejected for these variables in levels. To 
check for a second unit root we carried out a further unit root tests on first differences of 
the variables. When the variables are differenced once, all of the ADF statistics are 
significant at one percent level. Now, we can proceed with the analysis under the 
assumption that no variable contains more than one unit root and the first difference of 
each variable is stationary. Table 2 includes columns that describe the value for the test 
  25statistics and the critical values for rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis of a unit 
root. Both the ADF and PP unit root test results suggest that all variables are non-
stationary at 1% level, and integrated of order one I(1). Therefore, we use first 
differences of the variables in our estimations.  
  
Empirical results  
 
Table 4 presents results from the estimation of the basic regression equations (24) and 
(25).
9 LAB and EXP/GDP were included separately in both regressions as control 
variables. Since the explanatory variable ODA/GDP can itself be endogenous – a country 
receiving more aid in response to its economic difficulties – we run OLS as well IV 
(2SLS) regressions where the variable ODA/GDP is instrumented with its lagged value 
and all other explanatory variables as instruments. As the results show, the coefficient of 
ODA/GDP is consistently negative and significant at 99% confidence level. Our finding 
on the effect of foreign aid on tax efforts is consistent with many other studies, cross-
section and time series for other countries (see, for example, McGillvary and Morrissey 
(2004)). 
The value of the coefficient of D(ODA_GDP) in PUBINV/TOTEXP equations is 
roughly -0.31 and that in TAXREV/GDP equations is -0.06. This means that one 
percentage point increase in ODA/GDP results in a reduction in PUBINV/TOTEXP by 
0.31 percentage points and in TAXREV/GDP by 0.06 percentage points. Thus, effects are 
significant but very small. 
                                                 
9 Since the values of our dependent variables are between 0 and 100, we also run the regression after 
transforming the dependent variables into  (TAXREV/GDP)/(100-(TAXREV/GDP)) and 
(PUBINV/TOTEXP)/(100- (PUBINV/TOTEXP)). The results which are similar to those in table 4 are 
presented in table 5. 
  26  The other interesting finding is that the estimated coefficient of 
(ODA/GDP)*DUMMY(96+) is significant and positive for PUBINV/TOTEXP 
equations, and positive but insignificant for TAXREV/GDP equations. The magnitude of 
the coefficient (ODA/GDP)*DUMMY(96+) in the PUBINV/GDP equations is +0.30 
meaning that the effect of ODA/GDP on PUBINV after 1996 is not significant. 
To summarize, we find that aid inflow is negatively associated with the 
government’s tax efforts in the sense that it reduced the average tax rate (as measured by 
the share of total tax revenue to GDP). It also had a small negative effect on the ratio of 
public expenditure going into public investment until 1995, but aid has had virtually no 
effect on the ratio of public expenditure going into public investment since 1996. This 
seems to imply that aid inflows during (and post) policy reform period (1996-2004) was 
efficient in a sense that it had a positive contribution to development projects through 
public resource allocation.  
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Equation  No.  1  2 3 4 5  6  7 8 



















































































R-Squared  0.41  0.24 0.46 0.16 0.72 0.72 0.73  0.73 
F-Statistics  3.34 1.97  7.2  3.81  12.24 5.36  13.02  5.39 
D-W  1.91  2.23 1.81 2.12 2.02 2.03 1.89  1.9 
S.E.  7.76  8.84 5.77 7.17 0.88 0.88 0.86  0.86 
 
***   Significant at 99% confidence level 
**    Significant at 95% confidence level 
*     Significant at 90% confidence level 
Instruments in the IV method are: Constant, D(ODA/GDP)(-1), Dummy(96+), D(ODA/GDP)* Dummy(96+), and 
either D(LAB) or D(EXP/GDP). Notations: PUBINV_TOTEXP is Public investment to total government expenditure (recurrent 
public expenditure plus public investment) ratio (multiplied by 100). TAXREV is tax revenue to GDP ratio (multiplied by 100). D(.) 
denotes first difference. ODA_GDP is ODA to GDP ratio (multiplied by 100). ODA_GDP_Dummy is in fact D(ODA_GDP) times the 
dummy variable for 1996-2005. PUBINV_T is PUBINV/(100-PUNINV). TAXREV_T is TAXREV(100-TAXREV) 
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R-Squared  0.25 0.13 0.39 0.19 0.68 0.68 0.7  0.7 
F-Statistics  1.62 1.19 5.43 3.77 10.23 4.62  10.98 4.66 
D-W  1.92 2.14 1.81 2.04 2.00 2.01 1.87 1.87 
S.E.  0.25 0.27 0.18 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
***   Significant at 99% confidence level 
**    Significant at 95% confidence level 
*     Significant at 90% confidence level 
Instruments in the IV method are: Constant, D(ODA/GDP)(-1), Dummy(96+), D(ODA/GDP)* Dummy(96+), and 
either D(LAB) or D(EXP/GDP). Notations: PUBINV_TOTEXP is Public investment to total government expenditure (recurrent 
public expenditure plus public investment) ratio (multiplied by 100). TAXREV is tax revenue to GDP ratio (multiplied by 100). D(.) 
denotes first difference. ODA_GDP is ODA to GDP ratio (multiplied by 100). ODA_GDP_Dummy is in fact D(ODA_GDP) times the 


























Rwanda has made major strides toward a sustained economic recovery following 
the genocide of 1994 and the subsequent formation of a civilian government.  The inflow 
of large quantities of foreign aid into Rwanda has made the extent of recovery and 
growth possible.  However, scaled-up foreign aid can have some potential adverse effects 
such as aid dependency. This may particularly happen if aid has a significant negative 
effect on tax efforts of the government and on public investments. In this paper, we carry 
out a theoretical and empirical study to examine the above issues as a first step toward 
designing the interventions to support the effective use of aid.  The results from the paper 
hopefully provide insights to the effective use of aid to support growth.  
The theoretical part develops an optimizing model in which the recipient 
government decides on the optimal level of tax and optimally allocates total government 
revenue (tax revenue and foreign aid) between current expenditure and public investment. 
Our theoretical prediction is that an increase in aid is likely to reduce the optimal tax rate 
and the proportion of public expenditure allocated to public investment.   
The empirical analysis uses time series data on Rwanda, to estimate that an 
increase in aid is associated with a reduced average tax rate in Rwanda, but the 
magnitude of the effect is very small. A 1 percentage point increase in aid to GDP ratio 
has reduced the rate of taxation by only 0.05 percentage point.  It would appear that the 
reforms put in place to strengthen the efficiency of revenue administration have mitigated 
the impact of ODA.  As for public investment, we find that an increase in aid also had a 
negative effect on the proportion of public expenditure allocated to public investment 
  30until 1995, although the effect is again not very large: a one percentage point increase in 
aid to GDP ratio reduces the proportion of public expenditure allocated to public 
investment by 0.3 percentage points. However, since 1995 the direction of this effect has 
changed.  The pattern of government spending and reforms adopted indicate that there 
was strong political will to adopt appropriate measures and policies to mitigate the 
potential adverse fiscal effects of aid.  As a result, in the case of Rwanda, as far as fiscal 
effects are concerned, foreign aid does not seem to have had a negative impact, 
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